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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS,
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, LOCALS NO. 222 and 976, for and on
behalf of membership,
Petitioners and Appellants
vs.

Case No. 8428
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, ITS BOARD
OF REVIEW, APPEALS REFEREE
AND CLAIMS SUPERVISOR, INTERMOUNTAIN OPERATORS LEAGUE,
ORANGE TRANSPORTATION
COMPANY and INLAND FREIGHT
LINES,
Respondents and Appellees

Brief of Respondents and Appellees
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioners and appellants, local unions 222 and 976,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and
Helpers of America, represent members of those two unions
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who filed claims for benefits for the period commencing with
the 19th day of May, 1955, and ending the 11th day of June,
1955. These claimants were denied benefits because it was
determined that their unemployment was due to a stoppage
of work which existed because of a strike at the establishments
of their employers which involved their grade, class, or group.
The claimants, through their authorized representatives, the
aforesaid local unions 222 and 976, filed a written appeal from
this determination of the Department representative. The
matter was duly heard by the Appeals Referee, who, on the
26th day of July, 1955, affirmed the decision of the Department
representative. Parties were notified of the Appeals Referee's
decision, and on August 5 the said duly designated representatives of the claimants, locals 222 and 976, filed an appeal
with the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of
Utah. On the 30th day of August, 1955, by a majority decision,
the Board of Review upheld the decision of the Appeals
Referee and the Department representative. The matter is now
before this Court on a petition for review of the decision.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For a number of years truck companies operating in Utah
and Idaho, including Interstate Motor Lines, Utah-Arizona
Freight Lines, Garrett Freight Lines, Inc., Gallagher Freight
Lines, Consolidated Freightways, Inc., Ringsby Truck Lines
Co., Pacific Intermountain Express Co., Inland Freight Lines,
and Orange Transportation had been organized into the Intermountain Operators League, and as such had bargained for

4
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the individual employers in labor negotiations with the four
local unions of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, and Helpers of America (in Utah and Idaho).
The Intermountain Operators League bargained as a unit for
the employers and the teamsters bargained as a unit for their
respective local members.
As a result of the previous bargaining by these collective
units, a Master Labor Agreement for the years 1952 to 1955
had been negotiated. This agreement by its terms ended on
May 1, 1955. On February 25, 1955, Mr. Fullmer H. Latter,
Secretary-Treasurer of the Teamsters, Chauffeurs, and Helpers
of America, local union 222, directed a letter to the Intermountain Operators League in which he stated: ''In accordance
with the terms and conditions of that certain Master Labor
Agreement between our Local Union and your League dated
May 1, 1952, and each of the Supplements and Addenda
thereto, it is the desire of our Local Union to terminate said
Agreements. We have authorized and instructed Joint Council
#67 to compile our requests with the other Local Unions of
the Joint Council and submit them to you as a proposal for
modifications and changes to take the place of the present
Agreement." (R 23).
On February 28 (R 24) Mr. Latter informed the Intermountain Operators League in writing that he had been
authorized and instructed by the affiliates of the Joint Council
to submit to the League certain enclosed proposed changes
to take the place of the 1952-1955 Master Labor Agreement
and Supplements and Addenda thereto. These proposals included demands for a wage increase, improvement in some

5
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working conditions, improvement in vacations, health, and
welfare plans, a pension plan, and certain other improvements
in the contract (R 46).
On February 26 Mr. Louis H. Callister, on behalf of the
Intermountain Operators League, notified the members of the
union Joint Council that the League and the members thereof,
as it pertained to a new agreement, wished to eliminate the
paragraphs of the Line Wage Agreement Supplement (UtahIdaho Intrastate and Interstate) 1954-195 5 as follows:
"Section 8. That portion which provides for additional
compensation for mileage in excess of 250 miles.
"Section 12. Eliminate this section entitled 'Check and
Fuel Time.'
"Section 19. Eliminate this section entitled 'Division
Points.' " (R 26).
On February 24, 1955, Mr. Callister, by letter, notified
the members of the Joint Council that the Orange Transportation Company, Inc., desired to bargain as an individual and
was willing to meet at any time convenient to the parties (R 25).
It is indicated by the record that there was no reply by the
unions or the Joint Council to this letter.
Prior to May 1, 1955, the members of the Joint Council
negotiated with the Intermountain Operators League at several
meetings. As previously pointed out, the unions made demands
and the League submitted counter proposals. Thereafter, meetings were held in Los Angeles between the union representatives and the employers of the eleven western states (R 44,
64, and 65).

6
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On or about May 17, 1955, Mr. Latter advised Mr. Callister by telephone that the unions were going to establish
picket lines at the premises of the Pacific Intermountain Express
Company and the Consolidated Freightways, Inc. At that time
Mr. Callister advised him that a strike against one would be
considered a strike against all. On May 19 picket lines were
established at the premises of the aforementioned two employers (R 45 and 64). The unions informed the companies
(other than Pacific Intermountain Express Company and Consolidated Freightways, Inc.) that on and after May 19 the
members would continue to handle all the freight in transit
and on the docks indefinitely (R 48).
With possibly one or two exceptions, the employer members of the Intermountain Operators League notified the unions
on May 19, 20, and 21 that the workers (members of the
unions) were being laid off and being put on a standby basis
(R 54). Deliveries of freight in transit at all but the struck
plants were completed (R 55). Some work, mainly the handling
of government merchandise (explosives, etc.) was done by
some union members through the week ending June 13, 1955
(R 48) . The pickets at the two struck plants were obtained
from volunteer members of the several unions and included
workers whose employment was for employers other than the
struck employers (R 56).
Assisted by the Conciliation Division of the Department
of Labor a Memorandum of Agreement was arrived at during
the California meetings_ and submitted to the Utah-Idaho
operators and the members of the unions. The members of the
Operators League were advised through their representative
7
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that there would be no differentiation between operators in that
everybody would have tq accept the agreement negotiated in
California, and in the event they didn't, there would be a
picket line in front of them (R 65).
The Orange Transportation Company and Inland Freight
Lines informed the unions that they were unwilling to accept
the Memorandum of Agreement, and on or about June 12,
1955, picket lines were established at Inland and Orange.
These pickets were withdrawn on June 19 (R 47).
The record shows that companies operating in the eastern
section of the United States or the Midwest out of Chicago
had placed an embargo on freight coming into the West, with
layoffs to take effect on or about May 1, and that there was
a later embargo placed on the movement of freight immediately
prior to May 19. There is nothing in the record to show that
any of the claimants involved in this matter were unemployed
prior to the strikes at P.I.E. and Consolidated Freightways
due to those embargoes (R 45 and 49).
The claimants in this case are employees of members of
the Intermountain Operators League (whose places of business
were not subjected to picketing) who were "laid off" at the
time of, or immediately after, the commencement of the strike
at the premises of the Pacific Intermountain Express Company
and the Consolidated Freightways, Inc. There is no claim for
benefits by the employees of the Pacific Intermountain Express
Company, Consolidated Freightways, Inc., Orange Transportation Company, Inland Freight Lines, or Milne Freight Lines
for the respective periods of the strikes at the premises of those
companies. At the time of the hearing before the Appeals
8
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Referee, the members of the Intermountain Operators League
and the local unions had orally agreed to accept the Memorandum of Agreement terms which were reached in Los Angeles
but had not yet signed an agreement (R 47).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECISIO:t'-J
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE SUPPORTED
BY EVIDENCE.
POINT TWO
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MADE FINDINGS
OF FACTS REQUIRED TO DISQUALIFY CLAIMANTS
FOR BENEFITS UNDER AND BY VIRTUE OF SECTION
35-4-5 (d).
SUBPOINT A
THE CLAIMANTS' UNEMPLOYMENT WAS DUE
TO A STOPPAGE OF WORK.
SUBPOINT B
THERE WAS A STOPPAGE OF WORK EXISTING
BECAUSE OF A STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE,
CLASS OR GROUP OF WORKERS OF THE CLAIMANTS
HEREIN.
9
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SUBPOINT C
THERE WAS A STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE,
CLASS OR GROUP OF WORKERS AT THE FACTORY
OR ESTABLISHMENT WHERE CLAIMANTS ARE OR
WERE LAST EMPLOYED.
SUBPOINT D
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN
APPLYING THE LAW IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSION
AND DECISION.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND DECISION
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ARE SUPPORTED
BY EVIDENCE.
Finding of Fact No. 3 (R 79) is supported by evidence
in that the parties wanted certain changes in any operating
agreement, which was to be effective after May 1, 1955. The
finding was arrived at after due consideration of the exchanges
of communications between the Joint Council and the Intermountain Operators League. On February 28 (R 24) Mr.
Latter, for the Council, informed the Intermountain Operators
League in writing that he had been authorized and instructed
by the affiliates of the Joint Council to submit to the League
"certain proposed changes to take place of the 1952-1955
Master Labor Agreement and Supplements and Addenda
thereto."
10
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On February 26 Mr. Louis H. Callister, acting for the
Intermountain Operators League, notified the members of the
union Joint Council that the League wished the new agreement
to eliminate certain paragraphs of the Line Wage Agreement
Supplement (Utah-Idaho Intrastate and Interstate) 19541955 (R 26).
The referee did not find that the 1952-1955 Master Labor
Agreement continued in force and effect after May 1, 1955. He
did reasonably conclude that as a matter of practical fact both
parties were, in effect, saying that they wanted a new agreement
effective on or about May 1, 1955, which would include some
and delete others of the provisions of the 1952-1955 Master
Labor Agreement.
After examining all of the evidence surrounding the
relationship of the Orange Transportation Company, the
referee reasonably concluded that although that company had
expressed a desire to negotiate separately, it did not, in fact,
accomplish its desires (Finding No. 5) (R 79). On February
24 Mr. Callister notified the members of the Joint Council that
the Orange Transportation Company, Inc., desired to bargain
as an individual and was willing to meet at any time convenient
to the parties (R 25). Nowhere in the record does it appear
thta the letter of February 24, 1955, was answered by the
unions or considered by the unions to have accomplished the
purpose expressed by the letter. It appears to be obvious from
the record that the unions considered and announced that all
members of the Intermountain Operators League would be
compelled to accept the same agreement which was ultimately
to be reached, and that there would be no individual nego11
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tiations with members which had as their purpose the changing
of the terms of said agreement.
The consequent strike which was called by the union at
the operations of the Orange Transportation Company, the
Inland Freight Lines, and the Milne Freight Lines was obviously
for the purpose of compelling those three employers to accept
the Memorandum of Agreement which applied uniformly to
the other members of the Intermountain Operators League.
The referee could not have reasonably concluded that there
was a withdrawal in fact by the Orange Transportation Company from the joint negotiations. The mere statement of a
desired withdrawal does not in any sense necessarily accomplish
that desire.
The referee in Finding No. 6 (R 79) properly found that
the unions had informed the League that they intended to
call a strike against Pacific Intermountain Express and the
Consolidated Freightways, Inc. He also properly found that
the League representative, Mr. Callister, informed the union
representative, Mr. Latter, that the membership of the Intermountain Operators League would consider that a strike against
one member of the League was a strike against all members
of the League. On or about May 17, 1955, Mr. Latter advised
Mr. Callister by telephone that the unions were going to
establish picket lines at the premises of the Pacific Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways, Inc., and, in fact,
on May 19, picket lines were established at those premises
(R 45 and 64). Mr. Callister testified that at the time of said
telephone call he informed Mr. Latter that a strike against
one would be considered a strike against all.
12
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There is no dispute over the fact that negotiations were
moved to Los Angeles, California, and that the unions and
employers of the eleven western states participated therein.
The appellant contends that the sole reason for the strike
against Pacific Intermountain Express and Consolidated
Freightways, Inc., was over the insistence of those two companies on the question of terminal changes. There is nothing
in the record to show that the union at any time advised the
members of the Intermountain Operators League, prior to the
strike of May 19, that the unions' only remaining disputed
issue was the issue of terminal change. It will be noted that
the matter of terminal change, otherwise titled "division
points," was one of the subjects in M~. Callister's letter of
February 26 in which he set forth the paragraphs which the
League desired to be eliminated (R 26). The issue of "division
points" was only one of a number of issues which were involved in the negotiations. At the time of the strike at Pacific
Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways, the
terms of the Memorandum of Agreement had not yet been
referred to the unions or to the members of the Intermountain
Operators League for approval. The issue of "division points"
was the subject matter of the general demands in the same
manner as were those dealing with wage increases, improvements in working conditions, etc., and as such affected the
entire membership of the unions and the entire membership of
the Intermountain Operators League. The mere fact that there
may have been more insistence on the part of the employers on
this issue is immaterial. The appellants would certainly not
argue that the issue of "division points" was one to be con-

13
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sidered separately and apart from the proposed new Master
Agreement.
The controlling factor in this case is that the strike at
Pacific Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways
was actually called to enforce union demands which were
the subject of joint negotiation between the unions and the
members of the League.
In Finding No. 8 (R 79} the referee properly found that
the unemployment of the claimants was due to the action of
the employers. It must be noted that the layoffs by the employers took place coincident with the May 19 strike at Pacific
Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways. It must
also be noted that the periods covered by the claims for benefits
in this case are with reference to the period which began on
or about May 19, 1955. It is apparent that the members of
the League in a concerted action laid off their workers in
consideration of the fact that a strike against one was a strike
against all.
The referee's Finding No. 9 (R 80) appears to contain
substantially the same statement of facts as is set forth by
the appellants in their brief on Page 13 in their comments
regarding the Findings of Paragraph 9.

POINT TWO
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MADE FINDINGS
OF FACTS REQUIRED TO DISQUALIFY CLAIMANTS
FOR BENEFITS UNDER AND BY VIRTUE OF SECTION
35-4-5(d).
14
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The referee in Finding No. 7 (R 79) found that the
unemployment of the claimants in this matter was due to a
stoppage of work. By means of Findings Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 7,
the referee found that the stoppage of work existed because
of a strike involving the grade, class, or group of workers
of which the claimants were members.
Specifically, the referee found in Finding No. 1 that the
claimants were members of the teamster union belonging to
local unions No. 222 and 976. In Finding No. 2, the referee
found that in negotiating for the 1952-1955 Master Labor
Agreement the several local unions bargained as a unit and
that under the specific terms of that agreement they notified
the members of the Operators League that they desired to
terminate the Master Agreement effective May 1, and that
they desired to negotiate for certain changes. Article XVII,
"Term of Agrement" of the 1952-1955 Master Labor Agreement provides:
"This Agreement shall be in effect from and after
May 1, 1952. This Agreement shall remain in effect
until May 1, 1955, and thereafter until sixty. ( 60) days
notice, in writing, shall be given to either party by the
other of a desire to terminate, change or modify the
terms therein. Such notice shall specify in detail the desired changes and all matters not specifically referred to
are automatically renewed. Negotiations shall be commenced within ten ( 10) days after such notice. Changes
or modifications thereafter made shall be effective
retroactively to May 1, 1955.
"It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that
supplemental agreements covered by the terms of this
Master, open for negotiations and modifications of
their terms, through proper channels or notifications,

15
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are not subject to the arbitration provisions of this
Master Agreement.''
The signatories to that agreement included the local
teamsters unions who notified the Intermountain Operators
League that they wished to terminate the agreement effective
May 1 and negotiate for changes.
The Joint Council for those unions entered into negotiations on behalf of their entire membership with the Intermountain Operators League. All of the claimants in this case
were represented, therefore, for the purposes of negotiations
by the Joint Council or, in other words, by the several locals
operating jointly. All of the claimants, therefore, became involved in any action taken by their representatives operating
as a unit.
The referee in his conclusion found that the unemployment
of the claimants was due to a strike involving their grade,
class, or group of workers at the factory or establishment where
they were last employed.

SUBPOINT A
THE CLAIMANTS' UNEMPLOYMENT WAS DUE
TO A STOPPAGE OF WORK.
Section 3,5-4-5 (d), Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides:
"5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or
for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
·· (d) For any week in which it is found by the Commission that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of
16
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work which exists because of a strike involving his
grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or
establishment at which he is or was last employed."
The appellants in their brief at page 13 state: "The unemployment of these claimants is because of the acts of the
employers in putting out an embargo against business, and
voluntarily closing down rather than to the lack of business
or the effect of the strike" (Emphasis ours). And again on page
21 of their brief, the appellants state: "Hence, the unemployment which existed from the 19th of May to the 12th of
June, 1955, was due to the lack of business and voluntary suspension of operations on the part of the employers."
In discussing the meaning of the words "stoppage of
work" in the Michigan unemployment act, the Court held:
"Section 29 (c) of the 1936 Act disqualified an employee for benefits if his unemployment was 'due to
a labor dispute ... actively in progress in the establishment.' The 1941 amendment of said section disqualified an employee for benefits if his unemployment
is 'due to a stoppage of work existing because of a
labor dispute in the establishment.'
"In making the 1941 amendment the legislature intended to change the meaning of the existing law. The
amendment was intended to disqualify an employee for
benefits only when his unemployment resulted from
a stoppage or substantial curtailment of the work and
operations of the employer establishment because of
a labor dispute. The phrase 'stoppage of work' refers
to the work and operations of the employer establishment and not to the work of the individual employee.
"Hence, employees who were discharged when they
stopped work and went on strike were held to be en-

17
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titled to benefits where the employer's hiring of new
employees prevented a stoppage of work, except for a
period of about 15 minutes, from taking place because
of the strike.-Lawrence Baking Co. v. Mich. UCC,
308 Mich. 198, 13 N. W. {2d) 260 {1944) ".
"Stoppage of work" is generally construed by the several
state agencies to mean a complete or substantial curtailment
of the work and operations of the employer. Only in a few
cases is the work stoppage a complete stoppage due to the
practical aspects of operating a business of any size. In most
cases, it is necessary to maintain a limited crew of workers
as maintenance employees to prevent the deterioration of the
plant and equipment. In some cases, as in the instant case,
there was a certain amount of what might be called emergency
freight (government and otherwise) which necessarily had
to be handled. The big bulk of the employees of the employers
in question were laid off and a substantial, if not complete,
work stoppage existed.
It appears that the referee, the appellants, and the respondents in this matter are agreed that there was a stoppage
of work during the period for which the claimants were filing
for unemployment compensation benefits. On this point, there
remains the question as to whether or not the stoppage of work
was caused by a strike involving the grade, class, or group
to which the claimants belonged.

SUBPOINT B
THERE WAS A STOPPAGE OF WORK EXISTING
BECAUSE OF A STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE,
18
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CLASS OR GROUP OF WORKERS OF THE CLAIMANTS
HEREIN.
The appellants tn their brief at page 26 state: "The
stoppage of work which caused the unemployment of the
claimants herein was not due to a strike, but to the planned,
arbitrary, unilateral plan of the employers to lockout their
employees." We agr~e that the claimants herein were unemployed because they were laid off by their employers.
The question presented herein is, "Did the strike at the
Pacific Intermountaip. Express Company and the Consolidated
Freightways, Inc., cause the unemployment of the claimants
herein?" In the case of the Olof Nelson Construction Company vs. the Industrial Commission, 243 P 2d 951, the Utah
Supreme Court ruled that in controversies where workers are
represented by their unions arrayed on one side against management in multiple unit bargaining organizations on the
other, the party to first use the weapon of its economic pressure
against the other side is the one chargeable with the responsibility of the work stoppage, and if a work stoppage occurs
as a result of a strike by any of die employees for the benefit
of all aimed at all the employers, then all of the employees
are ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits under
the provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act. In that
case the Court stated:
"Thus, the critical fact to be determined is whether
the conduct of labor or management is the primary and
initiating cause of the work stoppage, or as phrased by
Mr. Justice Schauer in the McKinley case: · ... It was
proper to relate responsibility for the work stoppage to
the party who created its actual and directly impelling
cause.'
19
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"That brings us down to the 'brass tacks' of the
situation in this case. There is no dispute about the
fact that claimants were all members of the Six Basic
Craft Unions and that the Building Trades Council was
their collective bargaining representative; that they all
belonged to the 'grade, class, or group' of workers
whose wages were being bargained for. We thus have
the Building Trade Council, representing the entire
group of workers of all of these employers, aligned on
one side of the controversy, and on the other side were
all 75 members of A. G. C. who were also bound together as a collective bargaining unit; the Unions and
the Association had established a long practice of
bargaining as a unit; the 1949 contract between them
was still in force at the time of the strike; by its terms
the employees as a group had agreed to bargain collectively with the A. G. C. representing all of the
employers. The only dispute and the only negotiation
between the parties was in regard to the wage scale
for the entire group of workers and against the entire
group of employers. There was no separate demand
made, no dispute existed, and no separate negotiation
was carried on or proposed with the Barker and Paul
firms (the ones picketed) . Even after the strike was
called, negotiations were continued between the Building Trades Council and the A. G. C. as a group.
"Under the circumstances here shown, it is indisputable that, although this strike and picketing was
actually carried on against two firms only, it was authorized by the Union as an economic weapon to put pressure on all of the employers for the benefit of all of
the employees with respect to negotiations of the
master contract."
In the instant case, we have a similar set of facts. The
claimants in this case are all members of the teamsters locals
which were bargaining with the Intermountain Operators
20
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League through the Joint Council of the locals. They were
bargaining for a new contract to commence May 1, 1955, and
to include provisions beneficial to all of the claimants. There
was no separate demand made and no separate negotiation
was carried on or proposed with Pacific Intermountain Express
and Consolidated Freightways, Inc., (the ones picketed.) Even
after the strike was called, negotiations were continued for a
Master Labor Agreement affecting the employers in the eleven
western states, which, of course, included the employer members of the Intermountain Operators League.
As in the Olaf Nelson case the strike and picketing was
actually carried on against two firms only. It was authorized
by the union as an economic weapon to put pressure on all
of the employers for the benefit of all the employees with
respect to negotiation of the master contract. After the strike
at Pacific Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways, negotiation continued in Los Angeles and resulted tn
a Memorandum of Agreement for a new master contract.
The Court in the Olaf Nelson case, supra, stated:
"Once the entire group of employers, A. G. C., became bound in a contract for collective bargaining with
the entire group of employees (Six Basic Crafts), then
these two groups, insofar as their relationship to each
other concerning bargaining for wages, hours and work
conditions under the master contract was concerned,
became as single units, one group to deal collectively
with the other group. That is the negotiation which was
being carried on and with respect to which the dispute
arose which gave rise to the work stoppage we are
concerned with. It is clear beyond a doubt that the
Union was the collective bargaining representative of
21
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these claimants; that it authorized and ordered this
strike against the two employers as an economic weapon
against all of the employers to force a wage increase
for all of the workmen in the Six Basic Crafts; that
the claimants were members of the 'grade, class or
group' for whom the strike was called; that the strike
was attended by success and that the claimants benefited
therefrom along with the striking employees and all
other workmen employed by the A. G. C."
In the instant case, the entire group of employers, the
Intermountain Operators League, became bound in a contract
for collective bargaining with the entire group of employees,
the teamsters. locals (Joint Council), and these two groups
became as single units, one group to deal collectively with the
other group. The union was the collective bargaining representative of these claimants, and it authorized the strike at
Pacific Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways
as an economic weapop to bring about the successful negotiation
of a new master labor agreement from which all members of
the teamsters locals stood to benefit. Although the appellants
contend that the sole issue in the strike against Pacific Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways was the one
involving the question of terminals or "division points" as
defined in the Master Labor Agreement, it must be remembered
that the issue of "division points" was raised immediately at
the beginning of the negotiations between the Joint Council
and the Intermountain Operators League at their first meetings
concerning the subject matter of a new master agreement.
There is no evidence in the record to indicate that at any particular point the union ceased to bargain with the employers
as a collective unit and commenced bargaining with Pacific
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Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways on the
single issue of "division points." As a matter of fact the evidence is all to the contrary.
Since the major issue in the joint negotiations was that
of the new Master Labor Agreement, the fact that the terminal
or division point issue was of prime importance to the two
aforementioned employers does not in any sense change the
character of the relationships between the multiple bargaining
unit of the employers and the multiple bargaining unit of the
claimants.
The appellants argue in their brief at pages 21, 26, and
27: "The strike against P.I.E. and Consolidated did not force
the other employers to cease operation, for the evidence is
that there was ample freight for them to operate, and some
Trucking Companies did operate during the time. In other
words, the Employers were in direct competition with the struck
companies for freight and the strike against P .I.E. and Consolidated would have greatly increased the amount of business
for the remaining carriers, and enhanced their operations."
This argument s~ems to indicate that the appellants are
in agreement that the shutting down of operations by the employer members of the League (other than P .I.E. and Consolidated) was directly due to the strike which occurred at
P.I.E. and Consolidated Freightways. As they pointed out,
in effect, the equipment which had been running practically
empty could have been used to a good advantage to carry
the freight which would normally have been carried by Pacific
Intermountain Express and Consolidated. The employers, however, chose to shut down their operations and lay off their
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employees as a retaliation in response to the strike at Pacific
Intermountain Express and Consolidated.
There is considerable mention by the appellants in their
brief of the two embargoes which were placed on the movement of freight from the Middle West to the West and from
the west coast eastward, but there is no direct evidence that
total unemployment of any of these claimants was caused by
these embargoes. There is evidence that the working hours
of some of these individuals who later became claimants for
the period commencing May 19 were reduced. There is also
further evidence that much of the equipment of the employers
involved in this matter was either returning empty or partially
loaded. This evidence, of course, corroborates the position of
the respondents herein that the employer shutdown oo May
19 was due directly to the strike of that date.
Further evidence that the strike at Pacific Intermountain
Express and Consolidated Freightways involved the entire
membership of the teamsters locals represented herein is contained on page 56 of the record. At that point the union
representative testified that the picketing was done by men who
volunteered for such picketing and that these men came from
the general membership of the unions and was not confined to
those employees who normally worked at Pacific Intermountain
Express and Consolidated Freightways. The testimony is that
the picketing was not compulsory. It appears to us that there
could be no surer way to involve the entire membership of
several unions in a strike at the premises of one or more
employers than the active participation by a cross section of
the general membership of all the unions in the strike activities
24
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(picketing) which took place at the struck plants. In this case
we have members of the several local unions who were normally
employed by employers whose plants were not "struck" or
"picketed" actually performing picket duty on a scheduled
basis at the premises where the strike had occurred.

SUBPOINT C
THERE WAS A STRIKE INVOLVING THE GRADE,
CLASS OR GROUP OF WORKERS AT THE FACTORY
OR ESTABLISHMENT WHERE CLAIMANTS ARE OR
WERE LAST EMPLOYED.
The appellants argue and quote numerous cases which
define the words "plant" or "establishment" in support of
their position that there was no strike at the plants or establishments of the claimants herein. We think the decision in
the Olaf Nelson case, supra, as it defines "plant" or "establishment" must prevail. In that case the Court said:
"Our conclusion in this case is that the sounder view
is to recognize these large scale bargaining units as
the groups involved within the meaning of the Employment Security Act. Their number and scope are
increasing. Both labor and management have seen fit
to resort to such a device for a uniform, ~xpedient
means of negotiating their agreements. There is no
dispute that the economic sanction of the A. F. of L.
in this case was directed against the entire employer
association. The strike was called for and on behalf of
every employee covered by the agreement. It therefore
directly involved all these claimants, at each particular
place of employment at which they were last employed.
25
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The strike was fomented by claimants through their
duly authorized union representatives. They are members of the group which gained a raise in wages because
of the strike and are parties to the scheme or plan to
foment it. Therefore they are not entitled to unemployment benefits. The order of the Industrial Commission is reversed. Costs are awarded to the plaintiffs."
(Emphasis ours) .
The Court further said:
"Inasmuch as claimants were members of the ·grade,
class, or group' for whose benefits the strike was called:
they were involved in the strike, and being so, they were
involved wherever they were situated, including in
their own plants or establishments . . . ''
Industry-wide or area-wide bargaining was practically
unknown at the time most of the state unemployment compensation laws were passed. The problems of definition of
terms which later arose due to the establishment of collective
bargaining practices were not, therefore, apparent. It became
necessary for the courts to determine the scope of the words
"plant" or "establishment" in relation to the scope of the
issues and parties involved in the cases arising out of these
collective bargaining matters.
The Utah Supreme Court, in effect, has in cases of multiple bargaining units extended the meaning of the words
"plant" or "establishment" to include all of the places of
work where workers for whom such bargaining is being carried out perform their services. In the Olof Nelson case, supra,
the Utah Supreme Court has quoted freely from the decision
of the California Court in the case of McKinley vs. California
Employment Stabilization Commission, 34 Cal. 2d 238, 209
P 2d 602, and we quote:
26
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"In McKinley vs. California Employment Stab.
Comm., supra, the employer association comprised all
of the Sacramento Machine Shop baking industry. The
Bakery and Confectionary Worker's Union struck the
Butter Cream Plant, a member of the association. The
association carried out their prearranged plan of retaliating against the strike by an association-wide lockout. The California disqualification provision reads:
'An individual is not eligible for benefits . . . (a) If
he left his work because of a trade dispute and for the
period during which he continues out of work by reason
of the fact that the trade dispute is still in active progress in the establishment in which he was employed.'
The court stated (page 606):
" 'At no time did the union purport to be directing
any action solely against the Butter Cream Plant;
instead, the union continued throughout to deal directly with the association for the purpose of obtaining a new master contract. To say, therefore, that the
act of striking the one plant did not shut down work
in other plants of the association which were subject
to the labor negotiations for the purpose of obtaining
a master contract is wholly unrealistic. Industry-wide
negotiations had been established by these employers
and consistently carried on for over 10 years.'
"Other quotations which emphasize the California
position are:
" 'It seems clear that under such industry-wide
single contract negotiation, economic action by either
side, whether strike or lockout would be considered
by each of the parties as action against the entire
group struck or locked out . . . The selection of a
certain plant or plants for a shutdown by strike at
a particular time was a mere matter of strategy in
the conduct of the trade dispute which equally involved all of the bakeries and their employees. This,
27
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in effect, applied the union's economic sanctions
against each employer and brought about the unemployment of all of its members. Had the association acted first by closing down one of the members
plants and the union followed with a strike against
all of the remaining plants, it would be equally
clear that the volitional act causing the unemployment was the initial shutdown.'
"Thus, as Mr. Justice Schauer stated in his concurring
opinion at page 608, the court held 'that it was proper
to relate responsibility for the work stoppage to the
party who created its actual and directly impelling
cause.' "
In the Olof Nelson case, supra, the Utah Court said:
"Our conclusion is that the various disqualification
provisions of our Employment Security Act reveal that
the underlying legislative intent is for the commission
to determine the claimant's eligibility by adhering to
the volitional test as announced in the Bodinson,
Bunn~'.s Waffle Shop and McKinley cases in California

SUBPOINT D
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN
APPLYING THE LAW IN MAKING ITS CONCLUSION
AND DECISION.
The appellants m their brief, Page 33, argue that this
Court in the Olof Nelson case, supra, did not lay down a
mandate that action taken against two of the group must be
deemed to be action against the whole group and the claimants
be denied benefits. We disagree. In this case, as in the Olof
28
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Nelson case, there was an established pattern of collective
bargaining between the Intermountain Operators League and
the teamsters locals. This is further evidenced by the fact that
there was in existence at the time this action started a Master
Labor Agreement affecting the members of the League and the
several locals involved herein. It is further evidenced by the
fact that the announced and accomplished purpose of the
collective bargaining at the time this instant matter arose was
a new master agreement covering, for all intents and purposes,
the same parties. The terms of the Master Labor Agreement
1952-1955 also made it clear that the parties intended to bargain
collectively either for changes in the old Master Labor Agreement or for a new agreement.
There certain! y can be no dispute but that such collective
bargaining took place in this instance. The fact that, after the
preliminary negotiations in Utah had occurred, the negotiations
were then transferred to Los Angeles does not alter the picture.
The plants in Utah which were struck (i.e., Pacific Intermountain Express and Consolidated Freightways) were signatories to the Utah Master Labor Agreement 1952-1955 as
were the striking unions.
The issues as originally developed in the early negotiations in the State of Utah did, as we have previously pointed
out, include the matter of "terminals" or, as defined in the
Master Labor Agreement, "division points." The issue, therefore, of the matter of "division points" was within the scope
of the negotiations as they were carried out from beginning
to end. While there may have been more difficulty on the
part of the unions in obtaining results they wanted with refer29
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ence to "division points," this does not make that issue any
less a part of the subject matter involved in the area-wide negotiations. As a matter of fact, the record indicates that for
all practical purposes all of the teamsters locals in the eleven
western states became involved in the collective bargaining
activities. The involvement of the claimants in the instant case
is made much more definite by reason of the fact that the
pickets performing picket duty at the struck plants were
recruited from the general membership of the teamsters locals
involved in the collective bargaining. This participation in the
picketing by the general membership also involved all of the
claimants in the strike.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion we wish to point out that the instant case
arising under similar facts and circumstances as those of the
Olof Nelson case, supra, falls squarely within the volitional
rule laid down by this court in that case.
The decision of the Industrial Commission should, therefore, be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General

FRED F. DREMANN
Special Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys fo1' Respondents and
Appellees
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